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Minhoto counterpoints: On metaphysical
pluralism and social emergence
João PINA-CABRAL, University of LisbonIn his classic work Contrapunteo cubano, Fernando Ortiz shows how two different plants and the products they yield can be at
the base of two distinct forms of life. The fascinating revelation in his essay is how these two products (tobacco and sugar), which
are central elements in the emergence of consumer society at the global level, give rise in their local mode of occurrence in Cuba
to distinct social environments. In this article I ask, beyond its empirical relevance, what methodological and analytical lessons
can we take from his essay? In reinterpreting Ortiz’s essay in the light of the forms of life that I studied in Alto Minho (northwest
Portugal) in the later 1970s, I hope to draw lessons that can illuminate our own present take on the still momentous matters of
social emergence and metaphysical pluralism.
Keywords: Minho, Portugal, metaphysical pluralism, indeterminacy, underdetermination, counterpoint, vagueness, differenceIn his classic book El contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y
del azúcar ([1940] 2002), Fernando Ortiz shows how
two different plants and the products they yield can be
at the base of two distinct forms of life. The fascinat-
ing revelation in his essay is how these two products
(tobacco and sugar), which are central elements in the
emergence of consumer society at the global level, give
rise in their local mode of occurrence in Cuba to distinct
social environments. He outlines the complex relation
between the nature of the plants, the nature of the prod-
ucts, the nature of the social relations of production, and
the control of themeans of production. These, then, come
to congeal over time into recognizable traditions of hu-
man experience.
So much we have read. Furthermore, we know how
influential the essay was in a long and distinguished his-
tory of debates concerning globalization, and particu-
larly globalization in the Caribbean and South America
(Mintz 1996; Palmié 2006). But, beyond its empirical
relevance, what methodological and analytical lessons
canwe take from it today?After all, it waswritten so veryheory. Volume 11, number 1. DOI: https://doi.o
phic Theory. All rights reserved. 2575-1433/202long ago and it corresponds to a problématique (that is
to say, to a set of intellectual concerns) that is decidedly
no longer our own. In short, in interpreting Ortiz’s es-
say, we necessarily betray his intentions, since (a) we
use a different empirical case, and (b) we resituate his ar-
gument in terms of theoretical positions he could not
have dreamed of. We should have no sense of guilt con-
cerning that, however. In fact, we honor him in this way.
We can only entertain the faint hope that, one day in the
future, other peoplemight do precisely the same thing to
our own contemporary proposals.
Metaphysical pluralism
In this essay, I mean to resituate Ortiz’s argument. Em-
pirically, I resituate it in northwest Portugal in the late
1970s, when I carried out fieldwork for what was going
to become in 1986 Sons of Adam, daughters of Eve: The
peasant worldview of the Alto Minho (1986a). Analyti-
cally, I undertake to address anew what the Durkheim-
ians used to call “collective representations.” That is, Irg/10.1086/713631
1/1101-0012$10.00
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within spatiotemporally linked social settings giving rise
to identifiable “forms of life” that correspond to shared
forms of dwelling and care, shared concepts and arti-
facts, sharedmodes of personhood, and shared economic
arrangements.
I see the value of this exercise largely in providing the
tools for ethnography to move beyond the background
assumptions concerning the nature of human thinking
that are implicit in such standard statements as “the X
believe . . . this and that,” or “for the X, a is b,” or “Xs
think . . . this and that.” Now, as it happens, in the early
1980s, when the final version of Sons of Adam, daughters
of Eve was written, we were already grappling with the
aporias emerging from the poststructuralist critique of
social theory. Ardener’s contorted critical essays (e.g.,
“Comprehending others,” [1977] 2007) and Needham’s
Wittgensteinianwritings (e.g., “Analogical classifications,”
[1978] 1980, or Counterpoints, 1987) were already trou-
bling our minds. Somehow, however, we had not been
able to see a way past the central forms of thinking that
we had inherited from mid-century social theory—either
in its Durkheimian collectivistmold or in its NorthAmer-
ican Parsonian individualist mold. In my book World:
An anthropological examination (Pina-Cabral 2017), I
address this same challenge by exploring possible means
of going beyond the mere critique of representationism.
Here, I want to further that experiment in the lines sug-
gested by Ortiz’s essay.
I start from the basic assumption that metaphysical
pluralism is the abiding condition of human existence.
Husserl noted that “for us who wakingly live in it, [the
life-world] is always already there” as a kind of horizon
(1970: 142). Yet “there is a difference between the way
we are conscious of the world and the way we are con-
scious of things or objects” (1970: 143). The latter “have
actuality for us only in the constant movement of cor-
rections and revisions of validities”—as a kind of “an-
ticipation of an ideal unity” that is never fully accom-
plished (ibid.). By metaphysical pluralism, then, I mean
that everywhere, persons who live awake to the world
are open to engage with the world in a creative and dy-
namic manner, being prone to embrace a diversity of
points of view (Pina-Cabral 2018a). As Lévy-Bruhl dis-
covered, persons are not atoms, they emerge fromwithin
what he labeled “participation” with other persons (pri-
marily, their early carers) (Pina-Cabral 2018b). As a re-
sult, they are prone to engage with a variety of points
of view, never holding a single or unique framework of
interpretation of the world—the unity of our life-worldis never more than something to strive for. Vagueness,
in a very general sense, therefore, is the default condition
of all persons. The word “vague” here bears two essential
implications: both that of indeterminacy—as in border
permeability, ambiguity, ambivalence, and equivocation—
and that of underdetermination—as in approximative-
ness, fuzziness, stochasticism, gradualism, and scale-
hopping (see Davidson 2001: 75–76; Pina-Cabral 2020).
By placing the focus on vagueness and metaphysical
pluralism, I am setting up a contrast with the sort of
structural-functionalism that was espoused by most
members of Ortiz’s generation. Our present analytical
condition leads us to diverge theoretically from the mid-
twentieth-century generation in two fundamental ways:
on the one hand, we reject the atomistic perspective—
that is, we do not see persons or social groups as unitary,
individual entities, but we see them as emergent within
sociality and therefore as being ultimately partible and
“dividual”; on the other hand, we reject the mind/body
polarization—that is, we see that sociality is a broad fea-
ture of life, that organisms and objects interact in com-
plex ways, and that perception itself is a social phenom-
enon that cannot be reduced to a representational account
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher 2009).
Notwithstanding, we still recognize that, in the field,
ethnographers come to encounter emergent collective
entities that require a holistic description in order to be
satisfactorily accounted for. The sort of dynamic processes
of structural constitution that Ortiz identifies continue
to preoccupy us today as ethnographers. For example,
he shows that, around tobacco and sugar, forms of life
emerge in history that are systemic because they possess
properties that are greater than the sum of their parts,
and that, as such, can be identified by social scientists
and described in their own terms. It does not seem pos-
sible to carry out ethnography without implicitly pro-
posing that the forms of life the ethnographer identifies
are complex but are identifiable, that is, somehow char-
acterized by emergent properties, possessing a level of
systematicity. In other words, what makes up a “form
of life” and how can an ethnographer identify it? That
is a question that we pose today again but in a new form.
Twentieth-century social science has made us all too
familiar with pluralized notions of “cultures” and “social
groups,” as if these reifications were observable em-
pirical facts corresponding to objectively occurring in-
dividual psychological processes of self-acknowledged
“identity” as in: “the Xs have a culture which each X
transports and by which he or she is identified.” Such at-
tributions of psychological identity, however, turn out to
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were discovering during the late 1970s. In naturalizing
“identity,” we are assuming, on the one hand, a natural
existence to “individuals,” failing to see persons as emer-
gent products of sociality, and, on the other hand, we
are assuming a representationist account of cognition
that turns out to be deeply unsatisfactory. Ortiz’s notion
of “transculturation,” therefore, attempts to resolve a
problem that can only be taken to exist to the extent that
we stick to a sociocentric culturalist view of “society.”
In fact, that is probably the most fascinating lesson
that we can draw today from Ortiz’s Cuban counter-
points. He is not telling us that there are different “cul-
tures/societies” in Cuba. Rather, he is telling us that dis-
tinct Cuban modes of living can be identified that are
patently diverse and that there are structural implica-
tions to this differentiation. Furthermore, he shows us
that the affordances provided by the distinct plants, their
distinct products, and their distinct processes of global
circulation lead to different modes of production, and
to different appropriations of the land. Most of all, how-
ever, he shows that these forms of life correspond to dif-
ferentmodes of personal constitution. In short, he opens
the door for an account of metaphysical pluralism in
Cuba. Cuban subjects are not all of one mold; they cor-
respond to traditions of personal constitution that differ,
since they correspond to the emergent properties of
these different forms of life.
Minhoto lives
Allow me now to carry out an exercise of retrospective
projection. When I found myself in the late 1970s in
the rural valleys of theAltoMinho (northwest Portugal),
I observed a region and a people that were in the throes
of a major transformation—it was all too patent to any-
one moving around (including theminhoto themselves)
that consumer society was making big inroads into rural
forms of domestic life andmodes of personal and collec-
tive constitution that had been identifiably in existence
since at least the middle of the eighteenth century, when
a new configuration of rural economy dependent on
maize production had become locally instituted (Pina-
Cabral 1986a: 1–30). By dating it in this way, of course,
I am already intervening, since it took me andmy histo-
rian colleagues at the time quite a lot of effort to identify
the historical parameters of the forms of agricultural and
communitarian integration that made rural society so
readily identifiable to anyone who became familiar with
the region.Yet, as an ethnographer at the time, if I were to be able
to produce an ethnographic description, somehow, I
had to identify (a) what different forms of life were in
existence in the region—since it was patent that differ-
ent forms of life were present—and (b) how these were
responding to changes that were occurring not only in
the region but in the whole of Portugal and, indeed,
in the whole world. My initial project was to account
for the forms of life of the rural population, but soon I
realized that I faced problems in doing that. In fact, I
came to see my very fascination with rurality as some-
how suspect, to the extent that it reflected some of the
central aporias of belonging that structured local society
and that posed serious problems of description, as I will
proceed to explain.
First, I had to account for the fact that rural society
itself was pervaded by dynamics of class differentiation.
There was an observable differentiation associated with
landed property. For example, daughters of landless
households found it almost impossible to get officially
married and most frequently ended up as unmarried
mothers. This, however, did not express itself openly in
terms of forms of life—or, as anthropologists are prone
to say, “in terms of culture.” Those who lived in rural
areas gave strong evidence of a unitary sense of local
community and shared an identifiable form of life in
spite of widely different levels of access to land and com-
fort. Rural people emphatically denied that there were
substantive differences between them. Moreover, there
was a dynamic of globalization that meant that men
were migrating to foreign lands where they were engag-
ing in very different socioeconomic environments in
order to gain the means to reproduce a local rural form
of life that was visibly no longer fully self-sustainable.
Second, I found that, in order to describe the peasant
form of life, it was necessary to postulate (even if only
implicitly) its local alternative. In other words, there
seemed to exist minhoto counterpoints. At first, I was
not aware of this. But, as I carried out my self-ascribed
task of describing the form of life of the peasants that
were engaged in a form of subsistence agriculture, I
found that I could not help but contrast it to another
form of life. It was only halfway through the research
that, progressively, it became clear to me that describing
the mode of life of the peasants in the hillside parishes
implied inevitably accounting for its local alternative,
the mode of life of the lower middle classes living in
and around the market towns and urban centers.
In fact, one of the difficulties that I had to confront
during the early processes of drafting my manuscript
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the regions, processes, groups, and forms of life that I
had, willy-nilly, to identify. For a serious-minded young
ethnographer like I was then, this turned out to be a
source of anxiety and perplexity (see [1993] 2008). Not
only were the terms to describe these emergent entities
muted in local everyday interactions but, by making
them explicit in my account, I was somehow breaking
a veil of comfort. I learned soon enough how to ask
about them and how to interpret the answers I received,
but the people I spoke to did not think it really advisable
to use clear descriptive terms about the different forms
of life. For them, these seemed to breach comfortable so-
cial discourse. As time went on, I became aware that this
kind of equivocation (this ambiguity of reference) was
operating at different levels of belonging. Only now, ret-
rospectively and with some hindsight, do I have enough
distance to be able to see that this discomfort with iden-
tification occurred at least at three distinct levels and
that they were interlinked.
The first level corresponded to the casa (the primary
social unit, that is, the social entity where persons were
cared for during infancy and where they received their
main forms of personal identification). The same word,
casa (lit. house), was used both for middle-class homes
and for peasant homes, and yet the nature of the two en-
tities differed radically, as I could daily observe. This dif-
ference was patent in terms of what and who composed
the casa, how it reproduced itself across generations, how
it was named, the role it played economically, how it was
inhabited, how they differed architectonically, etc. Dif-
ferent kinds of entities received a similar name.However,
this equivoque also operated within each of the forms of
life, where similarly named entities were being treated
differently.
As I came to observe, among the peasant group, there
seemed to be a further equivocation concerning how
casas came together into freguesias (communes, or bet-
ter still parishes, as they cohered around a church and
graveyard). Indeed, those who owned land were in pos-
session of a casa in a very different sense from thosewho,
although they did have a dwelling that they called casa,
did not own land. While the members of the casas who
owned land were treated as full members of the parish
(as “neighbors,” vizinhos), the members of the units that
did not own land were sometimes treated as neighbors
and other times as not. When I asked if someone was
someone else’s neighbor, the answer would be given in
terms of proximity of residence and it would include
people who did not own land. But, when I asked howmany “neighbors” there was in a particular parish, the
answer, now counted in terms of houses and not persons
(and the corresponding name list used to account for
participation in communal events), would routinely in-
clude only the casas that owned land. The casas of all of
those who did not own land were being left out. In short,
the very attribution of existence to the primary social
unit and its integration into a base community were de-
pendent on a set of values that both differed across the
two forms of life and instituted a kind of primacy of
belonging (a different ontological weight) to some over
others.
Then, I became aware of a further level of equivoca-
tion related to this first one. There seemed to be a prob-
lem in actually categorizing and naming the patent dif-
ference that existed between the two forms of life. No
one locally would be willing to describe him or herself
personally either by the adjective “peasant” (camponês)
or by the corresponding middle-class label (in local
terms, burguês). While the difference between the two
forms of life was more than clear to everyone around,
being called one or the other would have been insulting.
As time passed, I came to realize that this silence was
related to the equivocation that characterized the dif-
ferent levels of institutional belonging (domestic/casa,
communal/freguesia, national/povo). Somehow, who-
ever was a member of a peasant house that owned land
was in some way more of a member of the general cat-
egory of “people” (povo) than others (either the peasants
who owned no land or the urban dwellers). National
entitlement seemed to be informally accounted for by
means of a word themeaning of which shifted in parallel
with the equivocation concerning being a member of
the parish. The same ambiguity seemed to be present at
both scales, national and communal.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
general political culture in Portugal attributed the essen-
tial political primacy of national belonging to a category
that is named in the singular as o povo português (the
Portuguese people). But there was a clear disjunction be-
tween those who had the right to claim to be a member
of the povo and those who were supposed better to rep-
resent that same povo. This aporia was brilliantly ex-
ploited in one of Portugal’s most famous songs—“Povo
que lavas no rio,” byAmália Rodrigues, based on a poem
by Pedro Homem de Mello (1948). The poem’s refrain
famously declares that the poet shared the povo’s condi-
tion, but its life (and, implicitly, the hardship of it) he
would not suffer. This turned out to be themain question
that I explored in my second book on Minho—Aromas
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the end of the 1980s ([1993] 2008).
When I reached Alto Minho in 1977 only three years
had passed since a major political revolution had taken
place that had been carried out in the name of the povo.
Yet, I discovered that those whom everyone thought of
as the povo par excellence did not, in fact, feel that they
were represented by the Revolution. The politically
modernizing revolution turned out to have been carried
out by urban people who did not feel fully identified by
the category povo, in whose name the Revolution had
been carried out. A good part of the Portuguese (those
who lived in urban environments—certainly the politi-
cally most powerful) did not identify as part of the more
embracing category of “the Portuguese people.” By be-
ing urban they were somehow modern and cosmopoli-
tan. In turn, that meant that their claim to autochthony
was diminished. As my ethnography matured, I became
increasingly conscious of the fact that this equivocation
actually prolonged the duplicity of standards of belong-
ing related to the parish and the casa that I described
above. It turned out that I too (as a city boy) was part
of my own ethnographic entanglement.
Finally, the third challenge of description that con-
fronted me concerned how I would name the people
whose ethnography I was about to write. This was a
problem that I had not anticipated and that was derived
as much from the equivocation concerning political
belonging and rights of autochthony described above,
as from the tradition of ethnographic primitivism into
which I had inserted myself. I could have said that I was
studying the rural dwellers of this or that parish (the
pseudonyms I used at the time were Paço and Couto),
but that was not enough, since there was nothing special
or especially distinctive about these two parishes. They
were essentially like all other riverside parishes in the re-
gion and, in fact, I had chosen them precisely because
I felt that they were clearly characteristic of the whole
region. Now the broader region was called Minho, but
the upland valleys where I set up my observation post
were a distinctive part of Minho—the Alto (or High)
Minho. Yet, if I were to claim that I was studying the Alto
Minho, I would have to contemplate also the middle-
class people who lived in the towns and city of the region.
But there were two problems with doing that: first, I
could not claim to study all forms of life with the same
intensity; second, the middle class of the region did not
feel at all as being characteristically part of that region.
They claimed to be (and in fact were) engaged in a form
of urban lifestyle that was, to them, characteristic of thewhole of Portugal and, further still, of the whole of the
globalized world.
So, how towrite an ethnography of a peoplewithout a
name? I ended up opting for calling the collective sub-
jects of my study minhotos (Minho dwellers) but I had
to warn the reader that I was, in this way, manipulating
themeaning of theword bymaking it refer specifically to
the rural forms of life that, using sociological theory, I
identified as “peasant.” In local parlance, this form of life
had no particular way of being named that was not of-
fensive—for, of course, there were offensive names for
rural dwellers, who were supposed to be less educated,
less civilized, more primitive, more archaic, more savage
than urban dwellers. But, imbuedwith a good amount of
youthful earnestness, I loathed the idea of reproducing
such middle-class stereotypes.
In short, much as in Cuba, myminhoto counterpoints
were clearly identifiable but not easily named, as they
corresponded to an emergence that related conflictually
with the narratives of autochthony that structured the
long term of the Portuguese nation and the Minho re-
gion in particular. In fact, in an essay that I wrote after
publishing the book and that I used as the final chapter
of the Portuguese translation (1986b), I explored this
question of autochthony and the narratives of belonging
to a land which, ultimately, was not even supposed to
belong to the people who inhabited it. I had soon come
to discover that the people among whom I lived in the
hillside parishes of the Alto Minho did not consider
themselves to be the first ocupants of the land. Although
Minho had never been part of the regions of the Iberian
Peninsulawhere therehadbeen Islamic occupation,min-
hotos talked of a group of first dwellers that they called
“moors” (mouros, Islamic North Africans), who mani-
fested features that were strange mirror-opposites of
those they defined as their own. I was shown striking
rock formations where these mouro people were sup-
posed to have emerged from the ground and where they
still manifested themselves in a kind of oneiric claim to
the land.
What this meant, was that the ambiguity of belong-
ing to the land thatwasmanifested by the forms of equiv-
ocation concerning belonging that I described above
seemed to be ultimately impossible to resolve. I came
to see this ambiguity of belonging as an essential feature
of local sociality—a dynamic of creativity without which
the national political system would implode, as it would
otherwise have been too tightly closed in on itself. Much
later in my career, I was to explore further this same
sort of ambivalent openness in terms of the Portuguese
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countered a dynamic sense of belonging in places where
the Portuguese had settled in the past but were no lon-
ger dominant that I called “Lusotopy” (2014) and that
constituted a series of space/times built upon divergent
manifestations of forms of Portuguese pastness. These
references to Portugal represented the same kind of es-
sential cthonic ambiguity that operated as a door to cre-
ativity not unlike that which the moors played in the
Alto Minho.
Metaphysical pluralism and ontological weight
The kind of essential ambiguity in national belonging
that I have just described grants it a kind of dynamism.
This facilitates the management of actual real positions
in an ever-changing, historically evolving world. I con-
sider this feature yet another manifestation of meta-
physical pluralism, since it opens up the system founda-
tionally. I now want to argue that, within a single form
of life, there can be different modes of apportioning
presence and that these have a structuring effect upon
that form of life—they are features of its emergence. The
process of entanglement that produces a form of life as
an emergent entity does not dependon a closing of plural-
ity, an individualization. To the contrary, as I suggested
above, it relies both on vagueness (indeterminacy) and
on scale change (underdetermination), the two aspects
of metaphysical pluralism. I will rely here on an ethno-
graphic vignette which I have used elsewhere already for
different analytical purposes (Pina-Cabral 2017: 161–66).
As Bourdieu taught us, following in Mauss’s foot-
steps, a form of life is reproduced from generation to
generation as a habitus—that is, as a set of dispositions
that are manifested by particular persons ([1972] 1977).
As this happens, certain entities and certain configura-
tions acquire greater centrality within the economies
of meaning that structure that form of life. These are as-
pects of the world that, for those who share that form
of life, create a scaffold around which other aspects of
the world can arrange themselves meaningfully; thus, the
centrality of these entities is instituted over time by the
very process of constitution of meaning.
In short, certain aspects of the person or aspects of
the world come to “be” more than others; they assume
greater ontological weight—that is, certain aspects of
the world or hypostatizations of them play a greater in-
tegrative role in the emergence of a particular form of
life. It is not a matter of the existence of other aspects
being questioned or suspended, but rather a matter ofgreater confirmation. Certain aspects of person or world
are less prone to being silenced; they are more present;
there is a greater readiness to affirm their existence.
This came to my attention for the first time when I
was studying the way inwhich personhood ismanifested
in naming practices. I came to the conclusion that
certain aspects of personhood were attributed greater
ontological weight than others and that this was struc-
turally significant in terms of the general configuration
of the naming systems and their relation to the forms
of life to which they corresponded (Pina-Cabral 2010).
For the ethnographer, it is immensely important to
identify these, since they constitute central landmarks
in the configuration of each form of life and it is this
that Ortiz does when he shows us how tobacco and sugar
function as integrative aspects of their respective
“counterpoints.”
I will exemplify this by recalling a moment of epiph-
any during my work in the Alto Minho. By the time it
came to pass, the main period of fieldwork was over
and the thesis had already been examined. As I was now
living in Portugal, however, I could go back for shorter
visits to see my friends in Paço. I was preparing the ver-
sion of the ethnography that was eventually to be pub-
lished (Pina-Cabral 1986a). My closest companion in
Paço was a man everyone knew as Morgado who was
a passionate supporter of the “old ways,” that is to say,
the peasant modes of living that were by then becoming
obsolete and which were the central theme of my work.
This was a fascination we both shared and our sincere
friendship was rooted in it. He was a relatively wealthy
peasant who bossed over a large, traditional-style casa
and who had never been tempted to migrate, unlike the
majority of his coevals inMinho. Although he was polit-
ically agnostic (being prone towards distrusting human
nature in general), he had been the parish president (the
lowest level of elected official) for the last decades of the
fascist regime. This meant that, by the time I met him,
after the 1974 Democratic Revolution, he was in a sort
of forced retirement from public life; his cousin’s hus-
band had succeeded him as parish president. Still, he re-
mained the undisputed authority on all that had to do
with rural life.
Many of the people who had emigrated in the late
1950s and 1960s were now returning home and invest-
ing their hard-earned savings in buying back the land
that the wealthier townspeople had accumulated in the
1930s and 1940s, when conditions in rural regions in
Portugal had been dire. The dream of the returned mi-
grant was to become a landed peasant with a large and
1. The following four paragraphs are taken, for themost part,
from my earlier description of this event in Pina-Cabral
2017: 162–66.
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worthy life, even after all those decades living and work-
ing in Paris, Lille, Newark, or Toronto.
What they wanted to buy were not large tracts of
land, but small plots to grow maize, beans, and wine
(vinho verde) in what is a hilly, well irrigated region
(Wateau 2002). Still, their parents had lost the land they
had owned to the urban moneylenders or, alternatively,
had had to endure hunger andmisery in order not to sell
it. This meant that their children, who went away to
France or the United States, upon their return were des-
perate to show that they were not cabaneiros (literally,
hut dwellers)—that is, people of no concern, who did
not own land and, therefore, did not have a casa worthy
of the name. The land, not the building, turned out to be
the central defining factor in deciding whether one truly
had a “house” and, thus, whether one was truly a mem-
ber of the parish (the freguesia).
As a result, by the early 1980s, on the morning that
I went out to the fields down by the river with Morgado,
there were lots of people buying land and he was being
regularly asked by the registry office in town to work as
a land assessor. Throughout the whole district, he was
officially and unofficially recognized as the person who
could give the last word on such matters. We arrived
at the designated plot—a reasonably good one, with a
well-tended pergola all round it and a small stretch of
forest with chestnut trees uphill from it. A canal that
passed halfway through it irrigated the land. In this case,
as I seem to remember, the plot was of disputed heritage.
This was not the first time I had gone out with him
and I had quickly learned his basic moves. He would
start by dividing the land in easily measurable right-
angled triangles and thus, with three or four measures
of a long knotted string, he would ascertain its size in
square meters. Then came the part that constituted an
epiphany to me. He would mentally reduce the land,
whatever there was of it, to basic maize production
and ascertain, from the quality of the soil and the nature
of the irrigation, how many carts of maize such a piece
of land might yield. (Carros de milho, the traditional
land measure, refers to the old oxcarts that were by then
no longer in use, assuming that they were filled with
sheathed maize cobs.) Then he would add some value
for the likely wine crop; then he would subtract the value
of things like bad walls or falling-down pergolas; then
he would subtract some for the part that was forested;
then he would addmore or less depending on the nature
of the trees and whether they were above the main point
of access to the plot or below it; then he would countin the fruit trees that might exist; then he would take into
account the ease of reach from the main road; and so on.
What struck me was that the land was essentially
valued by how much maize it might produce, whether
it was best suited for that purpose or not. This seemed
extraordinary, since in fact the likelihood was that this
particular plot, when sold, would be used for building a
house. But, at that point, he had been asked to ascertain
“the value of the land” and there was no doubt for him
or for anybody else around (much as they certainly had
not thought about it like I am putting it here) that the
essential value of the land was what it would produce in
terms of the staple food, maize bread (broa).
At that point, I understood all of a sudden some-
thing that I felt I already knew but that I had not known
how to say: maize had greater ontological weight than
other foods, other aspects of the world, and most other
entities in general. I now understood why the central
marker of value for a peasant “house”was the visible gra-
nary standing out elegantly on its tall granite legs. Mor-
gado’s own, proudly placed in the hillside in front of the
door to his kitchen, had its woodwork painted in red, even
though, these days, it no longer made any sense to store
grain there, and it was mostly being used as a tool shed.
This illuminatedmuch of what I had alreadywritten in
the thesis. And, in fact, retrospectively, I understoodwhy I
had felt it necessary to go through the trouble of research-
ing certain things: to unearth the history of maize in the
region; the details of the ritual of bread-making and its
implications for gender relations and household consti-
tution; the central importance of female fertility in a re-
gionwheremarriagewas essentially uxorilocal; themean-
ing of not having land, not eating one’s own bread, and
therefore being morally suspicious; how people claimed
(against all likelihood) that they could taste with certainty
whether or not a portion of maize bread was made in
their casa; why in all the years I was there, I never man-
aged to get anyone to provideme regularlywith broa for a
weekly price; etc. (Pina-Cabral 1986a). I suddenly found
a nexus between all of these things and many more.1
In rural Alto Minho, by the mid-twentieth century,
maize, a crop that had arrived in the middle decades of
the eighteenth century, had become the staple food and
the mainstay of peasant living. Their world, as opposed
to that of the people in the towns and cities, was depen-
dent on the notion that the good life was one where one
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food was, par excellence, broa; all other foodstuffs were
seen as additions to it. Thus broa became the central
mode of distinguishing those who had value, and there-
fore had a right to be there, from those who did not, and
were therefore mere passing residents. Their persons,
their houses, their community existed more or less to
the extent that they were capable of ensuring their own
subsistence from their own land by means of broa.
I should note here that this did not mean that the
region was ever demonetarized. To the contrary, there
has been money circulating in these hills since the Pax
Romana brought the population down from the hilltops
to the riverside plots. Later, minhoto peasants were in
the forefront of Portuguese empire-building at the onset
of the modern era and, later still, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, of economic migration to Brazil, Europe, or North
America. Ever since the fifteenth century, therefore, there
had beenmen (and also, to a lesser extent, women) return-
ing to these houses from all sorts of very distant places
around the world (India, China, Africa, Brazil, Australia,
North America). Therefore, what was being celebrated
withmaize breadwas not sustenance as such—formany
of the returned migrants over the centuries had eaten
many and very diverse foodstuffs throughout their trav-
els or as sailors in the cod fisheries off Newfoundland.
What was being celebrated by attributing greater
ontological weight tomaize andmaize breadwas its cen-
trality in a certain form of life; the role it played in con-
figuring who each one of these persons was and desired
to be. What surprised me, in a way, was how I suddenly
was confronted with the presence of the past (the past-
ness) in a social situation where, indeed, the centrality of
maize was no longer what it had been. I was surprised
not by how things changed, but by how they survived.
For each one of those people, maize did not “repre-
sent” anything; rather, it tied up a nexus of meanings
that, in being shared and in acquiring hegemonic im-
plications over a long period of time, became more pre-
sent, more visible, more likely to be retained by each
person in his or her daily dealings. No wonder that, after
each meal, Morgado’s wife would carefully gather the
breadcrumbs left on the table top and spread them
around the house outside the walls. This way the souls
of the dead would eat them and be grateful, and thus leave
the residents of the house alone, granting it prosperity.
The way in which world is scaffolded not only by the
presence of entities but also by their relative ontological
weight might equally well be exemplified by recourse
to images such as the statues of the Virgin, the nativityscene, or the crucifixion that one encounters all over the
Christian world. These icons (and the stories that are told
about them) facilitate access to a set of meanings; they
constitute paradigmatic scenes (Needham 1985: 67–69)
to the extent that they are modes of apportioning onto-
logical weight, of reminding people what entities and ac-
tions are more present in their world. Stephan Palmié
wisely claims: “All human lifeworlds . . . include agentive
‘nonhuman’mediators that, in their ownways and to lo-
cally and historically varying degrees, not only generate
affordances, but also make demands upon us” (2014:
155). To further his insight, one might claim that (a) the
“nonhuman” quality of these mediators is bound to be
ambivalent, since they are an integral part of the emer-
gence of each one of us as a person (we participate in
things too—see Pina-Cabral 2018b), and (b) we must
be attentive not only to their intervening in our life-
worlds as affordances, but also to the varying intensity
of their intervention.
If I now attempt to shift my gaze to the other min-
hoto counterpoint—the form of life of the urbanmiddle
classes—I can clearly see thatmaizewas present in town,
too, yet it played no significant role, apart from its use as
a component in the fabrication of a locally cherished
type of bread. The closest simile among the urban dwell-
ers to the role played by maize in the peasant worldview
is probably the role played by money and particularly
money aswhatmakes up a salary. Recently,muchground-
breaking anthropological work has been undertaken that
shows howmoney is labile as a social relation, constitut-
ing “an integral part of the hierarchies and networks of
exchange through which it circulates” (Hart and Ortiz
2014: 466; see also Neiburg 2016). This discussion, how-
ever, neednot occupy us at this point, sincewhat I wanted
to exemplify above by reference to maize can easily be
generalized: forms of life are emergent features of the
world of humans and part of the aspect of their emer-
gence is the relative ontological weight attributed to dif-
ferent aspects of the world. This “distributed ontology,”
as we might call it, is part of what I call metaphysical
pluralism and it shows how emergence results from
the entanglement of everyday life through the way in
which certain aspects of the world come to interact with
the form of life as a whole (see Hattiangadi 2005).
Conclusion
At this point, however, we are still left with a prob-
lem associated with the musical metaphor of “counter-
points” proposed by Ortiz. The dictionary definition of
2. I propose here that an ethnography of presence need not
imply a collapse into ethnocentrism, a metaphysics of pres-
ence, in the sense Derrida gives to these expressions (1967).
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harmonically interdependent yet independent in rhythm
and contour.” In other words, what he proposes is that
each of the elements of the contrapunteo is “indepen-
dent in rhythm and contour” but harmonically interde-
pendent to the extent that both of them participate in
each other mutually. Counterpoint implies scale, for it
implies that the parts, as parts, relate with the whole, as
whole. That is, the two components are mutual not only
in the sense of affecting each other, but also in the sense
of somehow sharing a common existence at a higher scale
(Pina-Cabral 2013); they participate in each other while
remaining separately structured.
Now, in the history of Cuba, Ortiz argues at length
that the two forms of life that he identifies—surrounding
tobacco and sugar—are independent in the way they
structure themselves and in their internal dynamics, yet
they both come to contribute towards and interact within
what, at a higher level, is the national existence of Cuba.
We are left with a strange doubt: is the oppositional
(binarist) nature of the counterpunctuality part of what
creates that relation of independent interdependence
that gives rise to what he calls “transculturality”? Or is
it merely that in Cuba there are two forms of life, when
it would be perfectly possible for three to exist? This
question is sneaky. It does not seem to bear a clear an-
swer, but the trouble it causes (that is, the entanglement
between observer measurement and emergence) is all
the more problematic for it.
Much the same can be asked about the counterpunc-
tuality of the peasant and urban modes of life that I ob-
served in the Alto Minho. In fact, we were long ago re-
minded by the classic work of Robert Redfield that the
two modes of life are historically interdependent, not
only in southern Europe but also wherever a form of
peasant life has come into existence around the globe
(Redfield 1956). He speaks of the “little community”
as being a “part-society,” to the extent that it is largely
separate from state society in its internal constitution
but deeply dependent on it. In Minho too, the role of
the small towns and their urban elites as instruments
of encompassment of peasant economy and peasant re-
ligious life cannot be played down. Nor is it in any way
easy to decide chronologically when it was that all this
started. Ever since Roman occupation (ca. 3rd century
BC), when the populations of the hilltop hamlets (the
castros) were driven out of their eagle nests and made
to work the fertile fields of the lower lands as serfs of Ro-
manized landlords, a relation evolved ofmutual interde-
pendence based on relative separation.As Portugal changed in the course of the 1980s, and
particularly after it entered the EuropeanEconomicCom-
munity in 1986, for the first time in over a millennium,
this counterpunctual relation seems to have vanished.
There are still manifestations of rural/urban differentia-
tion, but the sense of diversification of a worldview, the
sense of distinct traditions of personal identification that
were carried by the peasant/urban counterpunctuality
seems to have vanished. Most people in the countryside
live today in what can be considered a form of periur-
banity. This is not unique to Portugal, of course. It is,
indeed, a broader feature of southern Europe—of those
regions of our semi-continent where the industrial rev-
olution did not manifest itself with great impact during
the nineteenth century.
What does this mean for the way in which society is
structured in southern Europe today? How will it come
to affect the sense of national belonging, particularly by
relation to the ultimatemeasure of political legitimacy—
I mean autochthony? Might we consider that the role
that immigration has been playing of late as a kind of
phantasmagoria of national ideological life is a form of
reinstitution of the sort of counterpunctually ambiguous
imbalance of belonging that characterized the urban/
rural polarity, as we saw it manifested in the indetermi-
nacy of meaning of the word povo? Is there anywhere in
the world where autochthony does not present itself as a
dynamic aporia? If this aporic nature of autochthony is a
general condition of sociality, then, metaphysical plural-
ism is a feature of all long-term processes of social con-
stitution. The contrapunteo, then, would not be a Cuban
idiosyncrasy, but a historical inevitability of all mature
social systems.
What these observations suggest is that schismogen-
esis is an inevitable aspect of all ontogenesis. In other
words, the persistence of entities in time (each person,
each house, each nation) is mutually dependent on their
relative differentiation in space (the contrast of different
forms of life)—this would be the ultimate implication of
the concept of metaphysical pluralism.2 In taking that
stand, we would be retracing the footsteps of Derrida,
when he insists on the dual meaning of constitutive “dif-
ference” (différance, 1982: 6–9): meaning at the same
time both “to defer” in time and “to diverge” in space.
These are questions that I leave here as challenges. But
João PINA-CABRAL 200they do emerge directly fromour reading ofOrtiz’s work
all these decades after it was written. They are proof of
the creativity and acuteness of his initial vision.Acknowledgments
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